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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The appellants (collectively the "State11 unless other-
vise indicated) issued an audit of State Coal Lease No* ML-25005 
(the "State Lease") to the respondents (collectively "Consol" 
unless otherwise indicated) and demanded payment of alleged 
unpaid royalties* Consol protested to the Director of the 
Division of State Lands and Forestry (the "Director") who upheld 
the audit. Consol filed a complaint for declaratory judgment 
against the State challenging the audit* This appeal is brought 
by the State from the District Court's Memorandum Decision and 
Declaratory Judgment granting summary judgment for Consol. The 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal under Utah Code sections 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii) and 
78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented for review on this appeal are as 
follows: 
1* Did the District Court properly find that the 
State and Consol entered into an agreement for the payment of 
lease royalties at the rate of 17** cents per ton. 
1
 In accord with Rule 24(b) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, Consol includes its own statement of issues. 
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2. Did the District Court properly find that the 
royalty provision of the State Lease is ambiguous as a matter of 
law. 
3. Did the District Court properly construe the 
royalty provision in light of the parties' course of conduct 
interpreting the royalty rate to be 17h cents per ton* 
4. Did the District Court properly conclude that the 
royalty provision is not self-executing but would require affir-
mative action on the part of the State to increase the royalty 
rate above 17H cents per ton. 
5. Did the District Court properly find the State 
acted in its proprietary capacity with regard to leasing the 
state lands involved in this case. 
6. Did the District Court properly conclude, on an 
alternate basis, that the State is estopped as a matter of law 
from demanding royalty payments from Consol in excess of 17% 
cents per ton. 
7. Did the District Court properly conclude, that 
even if the State were acting in its governmental capacity, it 
still would be estopped from asserting a royalty rate other than 
nh cents per ton. 
8. Did the District Court properly consider the law 
regarding school trust lands. 
-2-
9. Is the State's new royalty policy a rule vhich is 
invalid because of the State's failure to follow the provisions 
of the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
10. Did the District Court properly find that the 
State had no right under the State Lease to impose interest. 
11. Does an arbitrary and capricious standard apply in 
this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This lawsuit centers on the State's claim against 
Consol for royalties alleged to be due under the State Lease for 
the period of July 1, 1979 to December 31, 1984 (the "Audit 
Period") and for the subsequent periods of time to the end of the 
term of the State Lease on January 23, 1988. The State Lease, 
entered into on January 23, 1968, provides that a royalty is to 
be paid to the State of Utah at the rate of 15 cents per ton or 
the rate prevailing for coal leases on federal land of similar 
2
 The State's Statement of the Case, and its entire Brief, is 
riddled with assertions of fact without references to the Record, 
as required by Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Rule 24(a)(7), 
and which are in fact unsupported by the Record. Appendix "A" is 
a list of such unsupported assertions. The Court has held that 
if the appellant fails to provide adequate citations to the rec-
ord, the judgment of the lower court is presumed to be correct. 
Fackrell v. Fackrell. 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1987). Further-
more, the information contained in footnote 1 of the State's 
Brief is not part of the Record and cannot be used to support the 
State's argument. 
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character, whichever is higher (R. 145-46, 587). The Minutes of 
the Board of State Lands and Forestry (the "Board") indicate that 
the State Lease was approved by the Board at a royalty rate of 15 
cents per ton (R. 145, 348, 473). 
In 1978, the Division of State Lands and Forestry (the 
"Division") represented to Consol that Consol could not commence 
mining under the State Lease until an agreement had been reached 
on the royalty provision because the provision was considered by 
the Division to be ambiguous (R. 146-47, 587). Later in 1978, 
Consol and the Division agreed that the royalty rate would be 15 
cents per ton, the same royalty rate under Consol's Federal Coal 
Lease No. U-5287 (the "Federal Lease") (R. 147, 587). Both the 
State Lease and the Federal Lease were included in proposed 
mining plans for Consol's Emery Mine located in Emery County, 
Utah (R. 147, 150, 473). 
3
 Article III, Paragraph 2 of the State Lease provides that a 
production royalty would be paid: 
(a) at the rate of 15£ per ton of 2000 lbs. 
of coal produced from the leased premises and 
sold or otherwise disposed of, or 
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the beginning 
of the quarter for which payment is being 
made, for federal lessees of land of similar 
character under coal leases issued by the 
United States at that time, 
whichever is higher 
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The State Lease was not mined until 1981 (R. 147, 588). 
In mid-1981, Consol informed the Division of its intent to 
commence mining under the State Lease and reached an agreement 
with the Division that the rate payable under the royalty provi-
sion was 17% cents per ton, the amount then required to be paid 
under Consol's Federal Lease (R. 147-48, 348, 475, 588). 
During the periods when Consol mined under the State 
Lease, from September, 1981 to June, 1983 and from February, 1985 
through January, 1988, Consol paid royalties at the rate of 17% 
cents per ton on a quarterly basis and submitted quarterly 
royalty settlement statements to the Division, which statements 
clearly reflect that Consol was paying royalties at that rate. 
The Division accepted each such royalty payment and statement, 
with no suggestion until October 15, 1985 that any rate other 
than the agreed upon 17% cents per ton rate was applicable (R. 
149-50, 349, 474, 588-89). 
In an October 15, 1985 letter to Consol, the State 
announced a new policy relating to coal royalties. The State 
asserted that under subparagraph (b) of the royalty provision 
(the "prevailing federal rate clause19), see supra. p. 4 n. 3, 
royalties for the Audit Period were due at the rate of 8% of the 
value of coal mined. According to the State, under the Federal 
Coal Lease Amendments Act of 1976 ("FCLAA"), and the regulations 
promulgated thereunder, the prevailing rate during the Audit 
Period for all underground federal coal mining operations was 8% 
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of the coal value. The State demanded payment of $126,981.88 for 
alleged royalty underpayment during the Audit Period, $70,211.21 
for accrued interest until the date of the audit and additional 
accrued interest after the audit (R. 150, 589). 
The parties filed cross motions for partial summary 
judgment. The District Court granted Consol's Motion and denied 
the State's Motion (R. 593). The State filed this appeal. 
By Order of the Court dated September 19, 1988, this 
appeal was consolidated with three other appeals. Consol's case, 
however, has an important distinction: it is the only case in 
which the State and lessee reached an agreement on the interpre-
tation of the prevailing federal rate clause. This agreement is 
an important distinction in Consol's arguments regarding contract 
construction and estoppel. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Each argument numbered 1 through 4 below is made in the 
alternative because each provides an independent basis for 
upholding the District Court's decision. 
1. The parties reached an agreement in 1981 before 
mining commenced, as required by the State, that the royalty rate 
4
 Consol's and the State's Motions were partial because they did 
not include the issue of whether Consol underreported production 
during the Audit Period. This issue was resolved by the parties 
by Stipulation filed with the District Court prior to entry of 
the Declaratory Judgment (R. 618-20). Consol conceded this issue 
because it involved only $243.15, which was not an amount suffi-
cient to warrant litigation. 
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payable under the State Lease was 17% cents per ton. The par-
ties' agreement at 17% cents per ton cannot be increased to 8% 
unilaterally by the State. 
2. The prevailing federal rate clause is ambiguous on 
its face because it is susceptible to numerous possible interpre-
tations. The parties9 agreement and course of performance 
indicates that they interpreted the prevailing federal rate to be 
17% cents per ton. 
3. The prevailing federal rate clause is not 
self-executing. Consol had no duty to pay royalties under the 
prevailing federal rate clause at a rate higher than 17% cents 
per ton unless and until there was an agreement between the State 
and Consol or a proper rulemaking by the State. 
3. The State is estopped from attempting to retroac-
tively invoke the prevailing federal rate clause and from denying 
the agreement at 17% cents per ton. In electing to mine coal 
from the State Lease, Consol relied on the State9s acceptance of 
17% cents per ton without objection and the parties9 agreement 
that the royalty rate was 17% cents per ton. If the State is 
allowed to repudiate its long-standing practice and retroactively 
apply a different interpretation of the prevailing federal rate 
clause, Consol will suffer great financial injury. 
4. The status of lands involved as school trust lands 
does not alter the agreement between the parties or preclude 
estoppel against the State. Utah law does not require that the 
-7-
State receive more than 17% cents per ton for coal mined from 
school trust lands* The State satisfied any trust responsibility 
it may have had. 
5. Because it has general applicability, the State's 
new royalty policy is a rule which, absent compliance with the 
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, is invalid and may not be 
applied prospectively, much less retrospectively. 
6. The State's attempt to apply its interest rule, 
which was promulgated after the parties entered into the State 
Lease, is contrary to the express terms of the lease and there-
fore invalid. Alternatively, the State is not entitled to 
interest prior to its first demand for payment of the alleged 
deficient royalties. 
7. The State is not entitled to summary judgment that 
8% of gross sales value is the applicable royalty under the 
prevailing federal rate clause because there are issues of 
material fact that must be resolved before such a determination 
can be made. If this Court holds against Consol on arguments 1-6 
above, a trial would be necessary to determine the applicable 
royalty rate under the prevailing federal rate clause. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY POUND THAT PLA-
TEAU HAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED 
ON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND THE LAW. 
K. The District Court Properly Found that 
the State and Consol Entered Into an 
Agreement for Payment of Lease Royalties 
at the Rate of 17% Cents Per Ton. 
Consol originally planned to mine the coal subject to 
the State Lease in 1978. In anticipation of mining, Consol 
telephoned the Division for its interpretation of the royalty 
provision in June 1978. John Blake, Mineral Specialist for the 
Division, advised Ronald Hughes, who was then the mine manager 
for Consol, that because the royalty provision was ambiguous, 
Consol could not commence mining until an agreement was reached 
to clarify the royalty rate (R. 147). In August 1978, Frank 
Lokash, another employee of Consol at that time, reached an 
agreement with Mr. Blake and Donald Prince, Assistant Director of 
the Division, that the royalty rate would be 15 cents per ton, 
the same rate payable under Consol*s Federal Lease, which is the 
only federal coal lease within the boundaries of the mining plans 
for the Emery Mine (R. 147, 348, 473). Consol did not commence 
mining until 1981. Prior to commencing mining in 1981, Hughes 
•gain telephoned Blake to confirm their agreement on the royalty 
rate. The parties again agreed that the royalty rate for the 
State Lease would be the same as the royalty rate payable under 
Consolvs Federal Lease, which at that time was 17*1 cents per ton. 
-9-
Hughes confirmed the agreement by letter to Blake, (R. 147-48, 
348, 474). In Blake's responsive letter, he noted that the lease 
was subject to readjustment at the end of its twenty year term in 
1988* The royalty rate payable under the Federal Lease was 17% 
cents for the entire period of the lease. In sum, the parties 
resolved the ambiguity by agreeing that the prevailing federal 
rate was 17% cents per ton at least until the end of the lease 
term in January, 1988. 
Based on these uncontroverted facts, the District Court 
found that the parties entered into an agreement in 1978 that the 
royalty rate would be 15 cents per ton (R. 587). However, no 
mining was done under that royalty rate. Prior to mining the 
State Lease, the parties entered into another agreement in 1981 
that the royalty rate would be 17% cents per ton until readjust-
ment at the end of the 20 year term in January, 1988 (R. 588). 
The State contends that the District Court's ruling 
upholding the agreement was tantamount to rewriting the Lease and 
that the Lease cannot be rewritten without approval of the 
Director, the Board or the Attorney General. The statutes cited 
by the State do not in any way indicate that the Director, the 
Board or the Attorney General have exclusive authority to speak 
for the Division. The Board is granted policy making authority 
over state lands. Utah Code Ann. S 65-1-1 (1986) (repealed by 
Trust Land Management Act, 1988 Utah Laws Ch. 121, effective July 
1, 1988). The authority to administer state leases is vested in 
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the Division, id. S 65-1-2.1 (repealed July 1, 1988). Applying 
the royalty provision of a mineral lease is an administrative 
function. Further, the Director cannot personally administer all 
of the State's mineral leases. This function was, in effect, 
delegated to the Director's staff. At no time did Blake, Prince 
or any other official of the Division suggest to Consol that 
Blake or Prince did not have authority to reach such an agreement 
or interpretation. Moreover, Consol finds it perplexing that the 
State asserts that Blake and Prince did not have authority to 
enter into an agreement with Consol when Blake and Prince signed 
the State's Answers to Consol's First Set of Interrogatories as 
"officers and agents of the respective Defendant agencies" (R. 
81-82). 
As set forth in Point E of this Memorandum, the State 
is estopped from asserting that there was not an agreement. 
Furthermore, the State cannot unilaterally revise the agreement 
as it now seeks to do. Regardless, however, of whether an 
agreement existed, the parties established a course of conduct of 
payment and receipt without objection of royalties at the rate of 
nh cents per ton, and such course of conduct governs as set 
forth in Point C of this Memorandum. 
B. The District Court Properly Found the 
Royalty Provision to be Ambiguous. 
The State asserts that the District Court held that the 
royalty provision is ambiguous "because the escalator clause 
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required plaintiffs to determine the prevailing rate from facts 
outside the lease." Appellants' Brief at 20. This is a gross 
misstatement of the District Court's Memorandum Decision. The 
District Court found the royalty provision to be ambiguous 
because it is susceptible of several different interpretations 
(R. 589-90). The law supports this conclusion that the royalty 
provision of the State Lease is ambiguous as a matter of law 
because it is susceptible of many varying and inconsistent 
interpretations. See Russell v. Valentine, 14 Utah 2d 26, 376 
P.2d 548 (1962). 
Several phrases of the prevailing federal rate clause 
of the royalty provision are ambiguous. The meaning of "land of 
a similar character" is unclear and could be construed to have 
several different meanings. Nor is it clear what is meant by 
"coal leases issued by the United States at that time." Use of 
the phrase "at that time" creates uncertainty. Finally, it is 
not clear what is meant by "rate prevailing." What does prevail-
ing mean? More than fifty percent? What if the breakdown for 
lease rates was 33 1/3% at 15 cents per ton, 33 1/3% at 17^ cents 
per ton and 33 1/3% at 8%? Was it the lessee's duty to obtain 
current lease rates from the United States Bureau of Land Manage-
ment ("BLM") each quarter? What geographical area was to be 
considered? Some of the numerous possible interpretations of the 
various terms in the prevailing federal rate clause are listed in 
the chart attached hereto as Appendix "B". When the various 
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leases during the same time per. u across the nat he same 
range of royalty rates (R. 469) to determii he most 
survey all currently issued federal coal leases either 
Utah State Office the Washinqton office * '" survey 
tftese lease 
coal leases «a effect during the Audit Period 469* <. 
H o v e v e i e i * h a d g a t h e r e d t h i s 1 i i format :i o 
hav e b e e n i m p o s s i b l e for Consol I (> d e t e r m i n e the prev 
b e c a u s e of the a m b i g u i t i e s iiitt t h e pr e v a i l i n g f e d e r a l rate c l a u s e . 
am 1 
provision does not have a plain meaning as the State asserts. 
Furthermore, if the provision has only one meaning and is 
1
 As set forth in Appendix "B", there are four phrases in the 
clause that are each susceptible of numerous interpretations. 
Using mathematics, the number of interpretations of the entire 
clause is equivalent to (1te number of combinations of the differ-
ent interpretations c I: each phrase, which Is 972 di stinct 
combinations. 
five producing state coal leases with similar royalty clauses 
interpreted the provision according to the State's reading 
(R. 153-54, 349, 475)? 
The State asserts that the prevailing rate clause is an 
escalator clause or "favored nation" clause and that escalator 
clauses are not ambiguous "if there is a formula or method to set 
the price." Appellants' Brief at 20-21. However, the State 
ignores the fact that there is not an objective formula or 
method to set the prevailing royalty because the prevailing 
federal rate clause is susceptible of so many different interpre-
tations. The cases cited by the State for the proposition that 
courts uphold favored nation clauses involve clauses that are 
unambiguous. 
The State's own officers and employees have acknowl-
edged that the royalty provision is ambiguous. In addition, the 
Division has demonstrated that the royalty provision is ambiguous 
by itself adopting different interpretations. Prior to 1985, the 
Division interpreted the prevailing federal rate clause to 
include only those federal leases that were producing in the same 
6
 The following officers and employees of the Division 
acknowledged during discovery in Trail Mountain Coal Company v. 
The Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, Case No. 880300, 
that the royalty provision is ambiguous: Ralph A. Miles, Direc-
tor of the Division; Donald G. Prince, Assistant Director of the 
Division; and John Thomas Blake, Mineral Resources Specialist 
with the Division. See Brief of Respondent Trail Mountain Coal 
Company at 10-11. 
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area. The Division was not ci,ro ~ a «*«;«*. ^  ;*«,<* *«** 
but would have recommended to the Board tha 
J 
now interprets the royalty provision in this case to have another 
meaning: the State now views the royalty rate I 11 be 8%, relying 
i l l ||||i iiii I 11 11  11 III III III 11 I11*1 "ii1'I 1 Ill 1 1 1 1 111 III 1 1 1 1 i11 III mi- i 1 1 1 1 " i 
within the State Utah since January 1979, 1egardless 
whether such leases are in production. 
The royalty provision mystified other agencies c, f I he 
state Legislative Auditc eneral requested 
opinio! 1 
meaning character" within the context 
the royalty provisior result Legislat: General Counsel 
Of 'iiii in 1 ii c 1 11 
ciently vague definition" becaus numerous mean-
ings. (R. -5-d U C 4L1KI 
I 
clause * capable numerous meanings an erpretations. 
Thus, the royalty provision is ambiguous as a mattei 1 
C The District court Did Mot Kevnte the 
Lease; It Properly Construed the Royalty 
Provision ^ i 11 , Light of the Parties9 
Agreement and Course of Performance 
Interpreting the Royalty Rate to be 1 7% 
Cents Per Ton, 
The S t a t e contend s 111111111 MM IMJUIII |i |un > 1 A 11111111111 m 1 1 m 1 \ 
provides that the applicable federal royalty rate cluring the 
Audit Period was 8% and that the District Court thus erred in 
construing the royalty provision according to the parties' 
agreement and course of conduct. The State presents general 
rules of contract construction in support of its interpretation. 
See Appellants1 Brief at 23. Many of the State's cases do not 
stand for the rule of construction for which they are cited. 
Further, the State totally ignores the rule of construction that 
the courts look to the interpretation of the parties by their 
course of conduct to construe ambiguous contracts (the rule of 
practical construction). Zeese v. Estate of Sieqelf 534 P.2d 85 
(Utah 1975). 
Contrary to the State's position, the District Court 
did not rewrite the contract; it simply followed the parties' 
course of conduct. The parties' course of performance indicates 
that they interpreted the royalty provision of the State Lease to 
mean that the royalty rate was 17^ cents per ton. Throughout the 
7
 Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061 (Utah 1981), 
does not hold that "the intent of the parties when entering into 
the contract controls the meaning of the contract." Appellants' 
Brief at 22. Naqle v. Club Fontainbleu, 17 Utah 2d 125, 405 P.2d 
346, 348 (1965), holds that "[w]here the intent and purpose can 
be ascertained, it should be enforced in accordance with its sub-
stance." Hal Taylor Associates v. UnionAmerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 
743, 749 (Utah 1982), holds that "[t]his Court will not rewrite a 
contract to supply terms which the parties omitted," and that 
"the first source of inquiry must be the document itself, consid-
ered in its entirety." The holding in Public Service Co. v. City 
and County of Denver, 153 Colo. 396, 387 P.2d 33, 36 (1963), that 
a contract must be construed liberally to protect the public 
interest, is limited to public utility franchise agreements. 
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entire Audit Per hereafter through i in I'IIHJI nui i lin  11. • 
terir ubmitted royalty payments accompanied by coal 
smittals which clea? 
reflected that payments were made 
ton. The Division never objected to the amount *y<* * 
payments :: i I: 1: >e • r o y a l t y i a I: .• is • :i :i it i Il 1 t , :i ssi 
The State's assertion that the intent 
eceipt market value 
highest royalty rate pai aaeraj. 
by the Record. See Appellants' Briei and 24. Furth^ 
* vi intent, f 
part ei course performance mtrary to 
should be enforced by the Court stated by the Utah Supreme 
dicater 
common sense concept that ,ons> >pr 
Bui lough i 2d 20, 23 (19 ;uorng 
Crestview Cemetarv A„»- _ . Diedei 
Eve^ "r s were to view the royalty provision to 
be clear on *u» -ontract should interpreted accord-
ing the parties"1 court 
performance is contrary wordinc contract. Eie v. 
St. Bei iedict"""s Hospita J A-L^U \Utah 1981). This rul* 
based on the reasoning that the course of performance 
ambiguity and that a court should not enforce the wording of 
contract when the parties have demonstrated that they intended 
the contract to have a different meaning. 
In this case, Consol paid royalties at the rate of 17% 
cents per ton, a rate which was clearly reflected on the coal 
production and settlement transmittals submitted during the Audit 
Period and thereafter until the end of the lease term in January, 
1988. The State accepted each payment without objection up to 
the time it issued the audit report. By these actions of Consol 
and the acquiescence of the State, the royalty clause as a matter 
of law required the royalty to be paid at the rate of 17% cents 
per ton. 
D. The District Court Properly Found the 
Royalty Provision Not To Be Self-Execut-
ing. 
The State views the prevailing federal rate provision 
to be self-executing. In other words, the State believes that 
Consolfs duty to make royalty payments under the "prevailing 
federal rate" clause arose as soon as that rate exceeded 17% 
cents per ton, without any action whatsoever by the State. 
However, the prevailing federal rate clause cannot possibly be 
self-executing when its meaning is not clear on its face. The 
District Court found that in order to be self-executing the 
prevailing rate would have to be an identifiable fact which could 
be independently ascertained by either party (R. 590). The 
prevailing federal rate clause is not tied to an identifiable 
fact or an objective market standard, and thus it can only be 
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construed as an open price provision under which the royalty rate 
f 
then through appropriate policy-making rule-making procedures 
as discussed in Point G of this Memorandum. 
anguag 
rate clause dictate tha : cannot be self-executing, the facts 
indicate that the part not 1 ntend the provisio 
self-executing The Board Minutes approving the issuance ot 
State Lease at the royalty rate J1 lb cents per ton indicate that 
i parties tha l » 11 5 
cents parties agreed to a higher prevailing 
federa <•  State gave Conso] rioti ce and made • a 
f fe ::! is u: a l l i a t ' s •. IF " :i ,:i tfc .ex ITIIJ :: » i e , 
the State never stated that I iieved the provision as 
self -execut ing and never stated that ii t expected Conso] tc 
contrary, the State in 1978 advised Consol that it was necessary 
that it reach an agreement \ ii till: i the • State c i it t h B I : j a] tj i a I: B 
before ni i i:i i ig cou] d begin, ii i J 98] , the parties agreed that the 
rate was nh cents per ton. 
the conduct of the parties show that the clause was not applica-
ble absent agreement, or alternatively, notice and a proper 
agreemen* equir ing royal t y payments lis i Il i '3 i cents per ton. 
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Because Consol paid 17^ cents per ton, it complied with the clear 
terms of the State Lease and owes no additional royalties to the 
State. 
E. The District Court Properly Applied the 
Doctrine of Estoppel Against the State. 
If the Court finds that the parties did not agree that 
the royalty rate under the State Lease was 17% cents per ton, and 
if the Court further finds that the prevailing federal rate 
provision is self-executing, the District Court's judgment should 
still be affirmed because the District Court found alternatively 
that the State is estopped from demanding payment of a royalty 
based on 8% of value (R. 591). 
1. Equitable Estoppel Applies Against the State — In 
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689 
(Utah 1979), the Court held that equitable estoppel would apply 
against the State, but that greater caution must be applied when 
the State is acting in its governmental as opposed to proprietary 
capacity. Ld. at 694 (quoting Metropolitan Park Dist. v. State 
Dept. of Natural Resources, 85 Wash. 2d 821, 539 P.2d 854 
(1975)). Equitable estoppel may be applied against the State, 
even when it is acting in a governmental capacity "if necessary 
to prevent manifest injustice, and the exercise of governmental 
powers will not be impaired as a result." Id. (quoting West v. 
Dept. of Social and Health Servs., 21 Wash. App. 577, 586 P.2d 
516, 518 (1978). In Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 
-20-
estoppel should not applied against the State. But when 
•plainly apparent" that th* application : f thi s i JLII! B #ould resuxL 
in injustice, and there would be ' " 'i i :: substantial adverse effect 
on public policy," the doctrine applies against tl me State. Id. 
• ,." 3 Il 8 
° The State Acts in a Proprietary Capacity When 
Leasing State Lands and is Estopped under the Undisputed Facts of 
proprietary capacities, the court Celebrity Club, c 
Metropolitan Park Dist. v State, 85 Wash. 2d 621 , 539 P.2d 854 
(1975) where the Washington Supreme Court held that the state :: £ 
Wash i ng t on was es topped f r om cancel 1 i ng a use deed f o i s t a t 
held that "when the State undertakes ILL dispose of public lands, 
either by lease or sriillf;1 ill illnpi ael?1. in its proprietary capac-
i 1:j ' ' I d a I: 1958. Il IIi M o m a n v. B0arcj u i state Lauds , 
695 (Utah 1976), the court held that estoppel would apply agar 
the Board, but found that the basic elements cf estoppel ver*-
thi- ill iii!11 i1! i-! in in 1 
Maughan expresses a view consistent vith majority opinio; 
the State acts to dispose of public lands, lease ,uua 
acts il mi: i its proprietary capacity ai icl equitable estoppel « * 
proper remedy•" Id. at 700. Thus, 11 District Court prope: 
concl uded tha 1: , tl: , si! • St .ill! A is • i siii; is ,' :: ti i icj 
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when it issued and administered the State Lease (R. 591). 
Consequently, the Court should view the State as it would any 
other commercial litigant and should not shy away from estopping 
the state where justice demands it. 
In Morgan, 549 P.2d at 697, the Court set forth the 
elements of estoppel: 
Estoppel arises when a party . . . by his 
acts, representations, or admissions, or by 
his silence when he ought to speak, inten-
tionally or through culpable negligence, 
induces another . . . to believe certain 
facts to exist and that such other . . . 
acting with reasonable prudence and dili-
gence, relies and acts thereon so that he 
will suffer an injustice if the former . . . 
is permitted to deny the existence of such 
facts. 
The District Court found that during 1978, prior to 
mining the State Lease, employees of Consol contacted Division 
employees, including the Assistant Director, to inquire as to the 
royalty rate. Consol was told that because of the ambiguity in 
the royalty rate, it could not commence mining until an agreement 
was reached as to the proper rate. An agreement was subsequently 
reached that the royalty rate would be 15 cents per ton, the same 
rate then being paid by Consol under the adjacent Federal Lease 
held by Consol. Consol did not begin mining the State Lease 
until 1981. Prior to commencing mining, Consol employees 
attempted to confirm the royalty rate by contacting the Division, 
which then informed Consol that the royalty rate would be 17^ 
cents per ton, which was the rate Consol was then paying under 
-22-
its Federal Lease. In reliance on this agreement, Consol pro-
ceeded to mine coal under the State Lease. During the entire 
Audit 
at nh cents per ton provided by the State, without 
any objection or comment , I: j the Stati (R 5911 92) 
^ n e u i s t r i c t eour |:: jnciuaea c i i Il: e basis 
undisputed facts that Consol would sho% substantial IOSA. in i i II II 
m i r ase at hi I I y i nil i III.. 
592). Thus, had the Division timely informed Consol that 
believed 8s applicable royalty rate, Consol would have 
Lease would not have been mined; and the State would have 
received no royalty lit 151-5?). On basis of these fac 1: .s, 
th fi! 13 p r o p e r l y c o n c l u d e d II III! ill I  l i i1 I'vl nil ii" in "• i stopped 
from demanding payment based on an 8% royalty. 
3 • Evei i if the Stale A Lit1 J «t. _a Governmental Capac-
i ty , It i s S t i l l Estopped — Even if I he State acted 1 n a govern-
mental capacity, it II1. si i l l estopped i I III i« basic elements • if 
i i > III in mi i l l II III iiiiiiiiiiiiiii in III mi > III in i i i i 1 II in II III II C c ;:i i s :::! Ill i> i :::}ii i l l ::::! 
othervise result, and if app 1 ication estoppe 1 i i i 1:,11:1  ,ii s ^ :::::::::a s€ ' 
would not have a substantial adverse impact > i:>ii public polici ^ ::::3::i 
P.2d at 718? Celebrity Club. 602 P.2d at 694 lllloving the State 
to repudiate aii agreement and policy on which Consol relied *»**« 
obtain a windfall at the expense of Consol is clearly unjust. 
Moreover, as the District Court noted, 
The State can still proceed to lease coal 
lands on any terms it feels profitable and 
that will give the State the maximum return. 
They still have the power to revise the 
wording of their coal leases to do away with 
any ambiguity and to carry out any legally 
established policy. 
(R. 592). Under these facts, estopping the State does not raise 
serious public policy concerns. 
The State argues that to apply estoppel in this case 
would prohibit it from correcting any errors found through the 
audit process. Brief of Appellants at 34-35. This case, how-
ever, does not involve an "error" by the State or Consol. The 
State consciously adopted a policy with regard to the prevailing 
rate clause. Because the clause was ambiguous, the State chose 
to enter into an agreement with Consol as to the proper royalty 
rate. The State is not attempting to correct an error; rather, 
it is attempting to retroactively apply a new policy with regard 
to the prevailing federal rate clause. However, the public has 
the right to expect that an agency will adhere to its policies 
until new policies are announced, and that when prior policies 
have been relied upon, new policies will not be applied retroac-
tively to the detriment of the relying parties. This fundamental 
principle was applied in Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 
184 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1950), where the court concluded that a 
new royalty policy such as that involved here could not be 
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ment of the Interior adopted a nev policy affecting oil and gas 
lease royalty calculations that conflicted with its pr oolicy. 
1 It attempt* ppiy zi 
payments that were outstanding because separate dispute 
between I III Department and its lessees summarily 
dismissed the Department's contention that such a policy cioulcil IIP 
applied retroactively: 
£ S for tjje government's claim that the 
Secretary might recompute the gas royalties 
owing where lessees had not paid the bills 
previously rendered, in other words, make his 
June 7, 1937 order retroactive, we think the 
[trial] court correctly construed the provi-
sion of the lease permitting the Secretary to 
fix the value of gas for royalty purposes as 
operating prospectively only. Statutes are 
always so construed. We think that a con-
tract provision as extraordinary as is the 
authorization t o f:i x values, should no less 
be interpreted as having prospective opera-
tion only. 
Id. a* itation omitted). The State ?« Prt tterer a 
position than the federal government was in Continental Oil. 
c'lFiiiiiiiiiii •, I1, a f t e < r 
ton as 1 lie1 applicable royalty rate under State Lease, change 
that policy retroactively to the • detrimer .1: of Consol. 
F. The Status of the Lands 'Covered by the 
State Lease Does Not Change the Agree-
ment Between the Parties or Preclude 
Estoppel Against the State 
'The State contends that the status of the lands covered 
by the State Lease as school trust lands allows it to repudiate 
.25. 
firmly established agreements and policies on which Consol 
relied. However, there is nothing illegal or improper about the 
State's past agreements and policies with regard to these lands. 
The Utah Enabling Act, the Utah Constitution and the applicable 
Utah statutes grant the Board and Division broad discretion in 
establishing royalty rates for coal mined from state lands, 
including school lands trust lands. See Utah Enabling Act, § 10 
(proceeds of lands granted for educational purposes shall consti-
tute a permanent school fund); Utah Const, art. X, S 5 (proceeds 
from school lands to be used in accordance with congressional 
grants); id.; art. XX, S 1 (school lands to be disposed of as may 
be provided by law); Utah Code Ann. S 65-1-23 (Board to prescribe 
rules and regulations prescribing amount of royalty and basis for 
calculation) (repealed July 1, 1988); id. S 65-1-18 (Division to 
issue leases under terms prescribed by Board) (repealed July 1, 
1988). Thus, the applicable Utah laws do not mandate that the 
State receive more than nh cents per ton. In granting the State 
broad discretion in establishing royalty rates, the applicable 
laws differ from the laws of certain other states which specifi-
cally limit the discretion of government officials in establish-
ing the value to be received from trust lands. See Kadish v. 
Arizona State Land Dept., 155 Ariz. 484, 747 P.2d 1183, 1186 
(Ariz. 1987), cert, granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3259 (1988) Oklahoma 
Education Ass'n v. Nigh., 642 P.2d 230,234 (Okla. 1982); County 
of Skamania v. State, 102 Wash. 2d 127, 685 P.2d 526, 573 (1984). 
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In establishing the royalty rate 15 cents per ton 
initially, ana xn subsequent I i .mil IIT IJIII I i. i r>yalty rate of 17% 
cents per ton, the State acted within its discretionar 
cumstance? enforcing the agreement between 
parties or estopping rote to 
LUC detriment of its lessee is contrary to public policy in 
Spratlinq w. State Lai id Board- 2d 342, 437 P 2d 886, 888 
(1968), the Court held that tne state co u] d i lot i ej i»1 *r '•' a 
cont granting a mineral interes school trust lands simply 
because the school imilarly, the State 
cannot repudiate its agreemen ,th Conso 
tenalize Consol, w***w. dealt with the Stat* 
faith. 
The State argues that Utah ' — requires the receipi 
disposition lands it 
cites a number of cases proposn 
Utah v, .- ,K ^ 56 (lOt rev'd. 446 i 
509 (198f Enabling Kleppe, however, 
offers no support State1s asser 
cited State involve different enabling acts, some of which 
contain specif value t M hr received 
from school trust lands. See supra urthei > 
c (iUi fill I I he blalt sanction what the State is attempt 11. 
do here: extract m repudiating an 
agreement and policy upon which Consol relied. 
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Moreover, even if the State's discretion under Utah law 
was limited in the sense that it had an implied duty of prudence 
when disposing of school trust assets, the facts show that both 
the State satisfied this duty. Indeed, as noted above, if the 
State had sought an increase from the 17h cent rate, the Lease 
could not have been mined economically by Consol and the State 
would have received no royalties at all. 
Finally, the cases cited by the State dealing with 
estoppel do not stand for the proposition that the State can 
never be estopped when leasing school trust lands. On the 
contrary, the decisions in these cases were closely tied to their 
specific facts. See State ex rel Commr's of Land Office v. 
Phillips Petroleum, 258 P.2d 1193, 1199-1200 (Okla. 1953); State 
v. Northwest Maqnesite Co., 28 Wash. 2d 1, 182 P.2d 643, 656-58 
(1947); Department of State Lands v. Pettibone, 702 P.2d 948, 
956-57 (Mont. 1985). These cases are not dispositive here, where 
a balancing test must be applied to the specific facts. 
G. The State's New Royalty Policy is a Rule 
which is Invalid Because of the State's 
Failure to Follow the Provisions of the 
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
Under the provisions of the 1985 Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, which was in effect when the State announced its 
new royalty policy, Utah agencies that adopt new rules must fol-
low the procedures specified in that Act. Utah Code Ann. 
-28-
S 63-46a-3 (1986) (amended 1987 and 1988). The Act defined a 
rule as: 
a statement made by an agency that applies to 
a general class of persons, rather than spe-
cific persons and: (i) implements or inter-
prets policy made by statute; or (ii) pre-
scribes the policy of the agency in the 
absence of express statutory policy. . . . 
Id. S 63-46a-2 (8)(a) (current version, as amended in 1987 and 
1988 provides that rule "applies to a class of persons or an 
agency11). The State's new royalty policy requiring an 8% royalty 
rate under all of the leases having royalty provisions similar to 
that contained in the State Lease is a rule within the meaning of 
this statute. Therefore, it cannot be adopted either prospec-
tively or retrospectively without compliance with the rulemaking 
procedures of the statute. 
In Williams v. Public Service Comm'n, 720 P.2d 773 
(Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court applied the provisions of an 
earlier version of the Rulemaking Act to a Public Service Commis-
sion decision that it had no jurisdiction to regulate one-way 
mobile telephone paging services. In that case, the Commission 
had since at least 1962 purported to regulate one-way paging 
services by issuing certificates of public convenience and neces-
sity to at least four applicants and denying requests for certif-
icates of authority to others. However, in 1983, the Commission 
reversed itself and announced, without engaging in a rulemaking 
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proceeding, that it had no jurisdiction to regulate one-way pag-
ing services. 
In considering the validity of that ruling, the 
Williams Court acknowledged that in some circumstances an agency 
may announce new policy in informal adjudications, but observed 
that this procedure is not allowed where the agency is fundamen-
tally altering a prior policy that had been relied upon by 
affected parties. The Court concluded that when a policy makes a 
"change in clear law" the agency is engaged in rulemaking and 
ruled that: 
Under all these circumstances, we conclude 
that the Commission cannot reverse its long-
settled position regarding the scope of its 
jurisdiction and announce a fundamental pol-
icy change without following the requirements 
of the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act. 
Id. at 776-77. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned 
that because the new policy of the Commission affected the four 
holders of certificates authorizing one-way paging services, it 
was a statement of "general applicability" and therefore a rule 
within the meaning of the Rulemaking Act in effect at the time 
the Commission issued its ruling, id. at 776. The definition of 
"rule" was revised in 1985; at the time Williams was decided, the 
statute provided that a rule is a statement that applies to a 
"general class of persons rather than specific persons"; however, 
the Court observed that its conclusion would not be different 
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were it to analyze the matter under the latter statute. Id. at 
775 n.7. 
Under the rationale of the Williams case, the State's 
new royalty policy announced in October of 1985 was a rule, 
vhich, absent compliance with the procedures of the Rulemaking 
Act, is invalid and may not be applied prospectively, much less 
retrospectively. As with the policy considered in the Williams 
case, the royalty policy, vhich affects all lessees having leases 
containing the royalty provision at issue here, affects a "class 
of persons." The policy prescribes the policy of the agency and 
it represents a clear departure from the prior practice of the 
agency. Under these circumstances, the State should not be 
allowed to enforce its policy, either prospectively or retrospec-
tively, until it complies with the Rulemaking Act. 
H. The District Court Properly Found that 
the State May Not Apply its Interest 
Rule to the State Lease. 
In the event that this case is remanded and it is found 
that Consol owes the State any additional royalties, it must be 
determined what, if any, interest is owed. The Court should 
therefore rule on the following issues only if it remands the 
case for a determination of the "prevailing federal rate." 
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1. Pursuant to the Express Terms of the State Lease, 
the State May Not Impose the Terms of the November, 1982 Interest 
Rule on Any Royalty Payment Deficiencies Should Such Deficiencies 
be Found to Exist — The State has demanded accrued interest on 
the allegedly past-due royalties through the date of the audit in 
the amount of $70,211.21. This amount represents interest at the 
statutory rate of 6% for the period from July, 1979 through June, 
1981; at the statutory rate of 10% for the period from July, 1981 
through November, 1982 and at the regulatory rate of 18%, based 
upon a rule adopted by the Board on November 4, 1982, for the 
period from December, 1982 through December, 1984. The State has 
also demanded additional accrued interest after the date of the 
audit. 
Article I of the State Lease provides: "This lease is 
granted subject in all respects to and under the conditions of 
. . . existing rules and regulations and such operating rules and 
regulations as may be hereafter approved and adopted by the State 
Land Board" (emphasis added). All mineral leases issued by the 
Board prior to 1967 are subject to the conditions and provisions 
contained in the leases. Utah Code Ann. S 65-1-96 (repealed 
1988). Thus, the State Lease is only subject to rules and 
regulations existing as of March 15, 1965 (the date of the State 
Lease) and "operating" rules and regulations adopted thereafter 
by the Board. 
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The Board had no rule or regulation regarding interest 
vhen the State Lease was issued. Thus, there is no regulation 
regarding interest which can be applied to this lease. Further-
more, the District Court properly concluded that the Board's 1982 
interest rule cannot be applied to this lease, because it cannot 
be characterized as an "operating" rule (R. 593). The Board's 
1982 interest rule is not a rule that governs the lessee's 
actions or operations on the land within the ordinary meaning of 
"operating." If the interest rule is an "operating" rule or 
regulation, it is difficult to envision which of the Board's 
rules or regulations are "non-operating" and why the Board chose 
to make a distinction between operating and non-operating rules 
and regulations in drafting the State Lease. The authority to 
impose new "operating" rules and regulations on lessees provides 
the Board with the opportunity to regulate mining activities on 
leased lands that might adversely affect the state's mineral 
reserves, the public health and safety or the environment. The 
1982 interest rule clearly does not fall within the ambit of this 
retention of authority. Thus, it cannot be applied to any 
royalty deficiencies which may be due under the State Lease. 
2. The State is Not Entitled to Interest on Any 
Alleged Royalty Payment Deficiencies for Periods of Time Prior to 
the State's First Demand for Payment of the Alleged Deficiencies. 
No interest charge, whether based on statute or regulation, may 
accrue in this case until a demand is made for the principal. 
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This rule was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Staker v. 
Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188f 1191 (Utah 
1983), which involved a claim for overpayments made by mistake to 
an irrigation company. The Court ruled that the prejudgment 
interest award should only run from the date that the plaintiff 
demanded the return of the overpayment and not from the date that 
the overpayment was made. Accordingly, since the Division did 
not make a demand for alleged royalty underpayments until October 
15, 1985, it has no right to interest, if any, until after the 
date of the demand. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE 
STATE'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The District Court denied the State's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment (R. 593), in which the State requested 
the court to find as a matter of law that 8% of gross sales value 
was the applicable royalty under the prevailing federal rate 
clause of the State Lease from 1979 through the end of the lease 
term in January, 1988 (R. 450). The District Court's decision 
was proper because the Record shows there were material facts in 
dispute necessary to the State's motion. Furthermore, the State 
failed to assert necessary facts in support of its Motion, 
including support for its assertion that the prevailing federal 
royalty rate was 8%. 
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A. Consol Raised Specific Issues Shoving 
that there are Genuine Issues for Trial. 
The Record does not support a summary judgment in favor 
of the State because there are genuine issues of material fact. 
Foremost among the material facts asserted by the State vhich 
Consol controverted is the following: The State asserted that 
the "federal royalty rate on leases issued since 1979 in Utah has 
been the same regardless of location, quality of coal, etc" (R. 
338). The State's ovn authority controverts this assertion and 
shovs that such royalty rates ranged from 5% to 12.5% (R. 469). 
Furthermore, the State's assertion assumes that a change in the 
royalty rate pursuant to the prevailing federal rate clause is to 
be based only on nevlv issued leases. This interpretation does 
not comport vith a plain reading of the prevailing federal rate 
clause vhich instead indicates that the rate is to be based on 
federal coal leases in effect at the beginning of the quarter. 
See infra, pp. 37-38. The royalty rates for federal coal leases 
in effect during the Audit Period ranged from ten cents per ton 
to 12.5% of value in Utah and across the nation (R. 469). 
B. The State Failed to Assert Facts in 
Support of Its Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment. 
Among the material facts vhich the State failed to 
assert in support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment are 
the following: 
1. Facts establishing that the leases referred to in 
Exhibit 1 to the Affidavit of Robert Lopez (attached as an 
exhibit to the State's Summary Judgment Memorandum) (R. 401) are 
for "land of similar character" or are otherwise relevant to the 
prevailing federal rate clause. 
2. Facts establishing that 8% was the "prevailing 
rate" for "coal leases issued by the United States," 
3. Facts establishing that the prevailing federal 
rate clause only pertains to newly issued federal coal leases. 
4. Facts establishing that 8% was the prevailing rate 
for federal coal leases for land of a similar character in effect 
at the beginning of each quarter of the Audit Period and applica-
ble quarters thereafter until the end of the lease term. 
In sum, because Consol raised genuine issues of mate-
rial fact and because the State did not establish facts support-
ing its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the District Court 
properly denied the State's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
C. It Cannot Be Said that the Prevailing 
Federal Royalty Rate During the Audit 
Period Was 8%. 
The State argues that the meaning of the royalty 
provision is clear and that the prevailing federal rate clause 
requires payment of royalties at the rate of the majority of the 
federal coal leases newly issued during the Audit Period. 
According to the State, under the FCLAA and the regulations 
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promulgated thereunder, the prevailing rate for all underground 
p 
federal coal leases after 1976 was 8% of the coal value. The 
State also claims that the majority of such leases was issued at 
the royalty rate of 8%, and that therefore the royalty rate 
payable under the royalty provision was 8%. 
Contrary to the State's position, the wording of the 
prevailing federal rate clause does not indicate that it refers 
only to nevly issued leases, and the State offers no authority 
8
 The contention that the federal law requires an 8% royalty 
rate for all underground federal coal leases is based upon a mis-
reading of the regulation upon which the State relies. That reg-
ulation provides: 
A lease shall require payment of a royalty 
rate of not less than 8 percentum of the 
value of the coal removed from an underground 
mine, except that the authorized officer may 
determine a lesser amount, but in no case 
less than 5 percent if conditions warrant. 
43 C.F.R. S 3473.3-2(a)(3) (1986). This regulation does not, as 
the State contends, provide for an 8% royalty rate on all under-
ground federal coal leases. Rather, it requires the Department 
of the Interior to consider whether a rate of between 5% and 8% 
should be imposed. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
recently ruled that this is the clear meaning of the regulation 
in Coastal States Energy Co. v. Hodel. 816 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 
1987). In that case, the court considered the Department of 
Interior's assertion that upon the 20-year readjustment of 
federal coal leases, the provisions of the regulation require the 
imposition of an 8% rate. The court rejected this assertion out 
of hand and ruled that the regulation does not "automatically 
fix" a royalty rate of 8% for all underground coal leases, but 
rather the Department is required to consider royalty rates in 
the range of 5% to 8%. id. at 507. Thus, even if the State 
could apply its new royalty policy retroactively, that policy 
would be invalid because it is based upon a misunderstanding of 
the federal law regarding underground royalty rates. 
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for such an interpretation. In addition, the clause does not 
refer to leases issued during the quarter but rather to leases 
issued "at the beginning of the quarter," which could mean that 
it refers to all leases issued before the beginning of the 
quarter. Consideration of all federal leases that were in effect 
during the reporting quarter would certainly comport with a plain 
reading of the clause and would result in a practical application 
of the clause. 
The State's interpretation that the clause refers only 
to newly issued leases issued in Utah during the reporting period 
is also nonsensical. Application of this interpretation would 
result in a royalty rate payable under the lease of 17% cents per 
ton for some reporting quarters when no new federal leases were 
issued, but 8% for other quarters when federal leases were 
issued. Specifically, as set forth in Appendix XV to Consol's 
Reply Memorandum (R. 562), Consol was in production during five 
of the twenty-two quarters during the Audit Period. There were 
newly issued leases during four of the five producing quarters. 
Thus, application of the State's interpretation of the royalty 
provision would result in a royalty rate of 8% for four quarters 
and 15 cents per ton for one quarter. 
The State has not established uncontroverted facts 
showing that 8% was the prevailing rate for federal coal leases 
of land of similar character in effect from 1979 through 1988. 
The underground royalty rates for such leases varied between 10 
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cents per ton and 12.5% of value (R. 469). A trial would be 
necessary to determine the prevailing rate for coal leases of 
land of similar character 1979 through 1988. 
III. AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS STANDARD OF 
REVIEW IS INAPPLICABLE IN THIS CASE. 
In the section of its Brief entitled "Standard of 
Review," the State asserts that the Director's decision should 
not be overturned unless it is found to be arbitrary or capri-
cious. The State admits that under Adkins v. Division of State 
Lands, 719 P.2d 524 (Utah 1986), the hearings held before the 
Board and its determination are deemed to be nullities and this 
case must be viewed as a review of the Director's decision, which 
is embodied in the Royalty Audit Report (R. 517) and the 
Director's February 5, 1986 response to Consol's November 12, 
1985 protest of that report (R. 559). 
In this context, no deference should be accorded the 
Director's decision. That decision was reached before any hear-
ings or evidentiary and legal submissions were made to the Board. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that where, as here, there is no 
record for the court to review, other than a protest and the 
agency's decision, and a complete airing of the issues and facts 
was not had before the agency, the court must conduct an indepen-
dent inquiry and may not simply defer to the agency's naked deci-
sion. Denver t Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. Central Weber 
Sewer Improvement Dist.. 4 Utah 2d 105, 287 P.2d 884, 887 (1955). 
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Moreover, this case involves issues of contract con-
struction and statutory interpretation and the application of 
equitable principles, areas in which courts do not accord agen-
cies any deference. Because these issues are wholly outside the 
Director's expertise, the Court must make its own "independent 
determination of the correct application of the governing princi-
ples." Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U.S. 
263, 270 (1960); see also Adjcins, 719 P.2d at 526 (on questions 
of statutory construction involving pure questions of law, no 
deference is accorded agency determination). The Directors 
decision turned on issues as to which the Division has no exper-
tise, was based on the most superficial of inquiries, and was 
made by an interested party, rather than an impartial 
decisionmaker. Accordingly, it is not entitled to deference from 
the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The State's claims constitute unconscionable overreach-
ing on its part. The lease language which it drafted is patently 
ambiguous. The State itself considered the language to be ambig-
uous and thus would not permit mining to commence until a royalty 
rate agreement was reached. An agreement was reached. Consol 
complied with its terms. Coal subject to the State Lease was of 
marginal quality and could not be mined at a royalty rate higher 
than the one agreed upon. That rate was at the same level as the 
rate for the only federal lease under the mining plan. Had the 
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State demanded a higher rate before mining began, three things 
vould have happened; 1) the State Lease would have been deleted 
from the mining plan; 2) Consol vould have produced the same 
amount of coal from other contiguous coal lands; and 3) the State 
vould have received no royalties vhatsoever, 
Consolvs case is the only case of the four consolidated 
cases vhere an agreement vas reached vith the State on the pre-
vailing federal rate. The State cannot unilaterally revise the 
agreement to increase the royalty rate to 8%. Furthermore, the 
State is estopped from denying the existence of the agreement and 
from asserting that the royalty rate vas anything other than nh 
cents per ton. 
The District Court's judgment applied retroactively to 
the Audit Period and prospectively from the date of the audit on 
October 15, 1985 until the date of readjustment of the State 
Lease on January 23, 1988. The District Court's judgment vas 
prospective because the court found that the parties reached an 
agreement that the royalty rate vas 17% cents per ton at least 
until the end of the twenty-year term of the State Lease on Janu-
ary 23, 1988, vhen it vould be subject to readjustment. Further, 
the District Court concluded that the prevailing federal rate 
clause "is not self-executing as to create a legal obligation on 
the lessee since the identifiable factors necessary for 
self-execution could not independently be ascertained by either 
party" (R. 590)). Moreover, the State has not conducted a proper 
. 1 1 . 
rulemaking proceeding to change the royalty rate. Thus, the 
State is precluded from recovering royalty payments of more than 
17*s cents per ton prior to the end of the twenty year term on 
January 23, 1988. 
The findings and the judgment of the District Court are 
supported by the Record and should thus be upheld by the Court. 
If the Court finds that a royalty other than 17*s cents per ton 
was required to be paid by Consol, this case should be remanded 
to the District Court for factual findings on the rovalty rate. 
DATED this jWl^dav of November, 1988. 
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-42-
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENTS to the following on this /& day of November, 1988: 
David L. Wilkinson 
David S. Christensen 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Gayle F. McKeachnie 
Clark B. Allred 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
313:110788A 
-43-
APPENDIX A 
FACTUAL ASSERTIONS OF THE STATE 
UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 
Appellants1 Brief at 4: "The United States Government owns 
most of the coal-producing lands within the State of Utah." 
Appellants9 Brief at 5: "When State Lease no. 22729 was 
issued by the State, the royalty rate on many federal coal 
leases was $.15 per ton." 
Appellants9 Brief at 7: "The lands that the Division of 
State Lands manages have thousands of mineral leases.99 
Appellants9 Brief at 7: "Instead the State of Utah, as 
written in its lease provisions and regulations, requires 
its lessees to accurately provide information and to pay the 
correct amounts of royalties. Like reporting taxes, it has 
largely been a honor reporting system." 
Appellants9 Brief at 10: "The State has a . . . moral duty 
to obtain full value from the disposition of those lands." 
Appellants9 Brief at 17-18: "The market royalty rate on 
coal leases, in the state of Utah, is controlled by the 
United States which has the vast majority of coal reserves. 
Lessees require long-term leases because of the capital 
expenditures involved." 
Appellants9 Brief at 18: "The State therefore, drafted an 
escalator clause in its coal lease which tied the royalty 
revision to the prevailing federal rate. That escalator 
clause insured that the State would, throughout the term of 
the lease, receive full market value." 
Appellants9 Brief at 19: " . . . with an ongoing loss of 
more than $2.00 per ton for coal produced after the audit." 
Appellants9 Brief at 20: *A reading of the royalty provi-
sion in the lease (Article III Second) shows that it is 
clear and complies with the intent of the parties that the 
trust lands receive the going royalty rate. It states that 
the royalty rate will be $.15 per .ton (which was the federal 
rate when the lease was signed). . ." 
Appellants9 Brief at 21: "Plaintiffs had the duty to deter-
mine any change in the federal royalty rate." 
Appellants9 Brief at 21: "The federal government owns the 
majority of coal reserves in Utah." 
Appellants1 Brief at 22: "Plaintiffs hold numerous federal 
leases in Utah, part of which require an 8% royalty." 
Appellants' Brief at 22: "The Plaintiffs . . . concede that 
the federal rate is higher than the royalty payment they 
paid prior to 1976." 
Appellants1 Brief at 24: "The Federal Government owns the 
majority of coal reserves in the State of Utah; therefore, 
the royalty rate charged by the Federal Government consti-
tutes the prevailing market rate in the State of Utah. At 
the time the lease provision was drafted the federal royalty 
rate was generally $.15 per ton." 
Appellants' Brief at 24: "The escalator clause was required 
by law and the obvious intent of the parties, when the con-
tract was entered into, was to provide a mechanism whereby 
the State would always receive the going market royalty rate 
from its trust lands." 
Appellants' Brief at 25: "One of the things that is certain 
about the royalty provision, in addition to the plain mean-
ing of Subsection b, is that the contracting parties 
intended that the royalty rate would change if federal roy-
alty rates increased." 
Appellants' Brief at 26: "They [Consol] have conceded that 
the rate has increased and subparagraph (b) applies." 
Appellants' Brief at 26: In this particular case the undis-
puted facts establish that the prevailing federal rate is 8% 
of value which is the rate Plaintiffs pay to the federal 
government on most of its other leases. Any changes in the 
rate can be easily determined by review of Bureau of Land 
Management records." 
Appellants' Brief at 34: "Indeed, the undisputed facts show 
that it was the State that relied on the Plaintiffs to pay 
the correct royalty amount. The Plaintiffs had the duty to 
the State to calculate and pay the correct royalty. Plain-
tiffs concede they are liable for failure to report all 
their production of the lease. The State did not have a 
duty to Plaintiffs to collect the correct royalty although 
it has such a duty to the school trust." 
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APPENDIX B 
Royalty Provision 
Language: 
Ambiguous 
Phrase 
DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF 
THE STATE LEASE ROYALTY PROVISION 
To pay to Lessor quarterly, on or before the 
15th day of the month succeeding each quar-
ter , royalty 
(a) at the rate of 15* per ton of 2000 
lbs. of coal produced for the 
leased premises and sold or other-
vise disposed of, or 
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the 
beginning of the quarter for which 
payment is being made, for federal 
lessees of land of similar charac-
ter under coal leases issued by the 
United States at that time, 
whichever is higher . 
Different 
Interpretations 
'at the rate prevailing1 1. the rate of the majority 
of leases 
2. an average of rates 
3. the highest rate 
"federal lessees of land 
• . under coal 
leases" 
1. all federal coal leases 
in the nation 
2. federal coal leases in 
the West 
3. federal coal leases in 
Utah 
4. federal coal leases in 
the same region 
5. federal coal leases in 
the same county 
6. federal coal leases in 
the same drainage area 
7. federal coal leases in 
the same mine 
B. producing federal coal 
leases 
9. non-producing federal 
coal leases 
"land of similar character" Land with: 
1. similar geological or 
physical characteristics 
2. similar access character-
istics 
3. similar degree of devel-
opment completed 
4. coal with similar fuel 
utilization potential 
5. similar environmental or 
regulatory restrictions 
6. similar labor force 
availability 
"coal leases issued by the 1. all federal coal leases 
United States at that time" in effect on the date of 
the beginning of the 
reporting quarter 
2. all federal coal leases 
in effect during the 
reporting quarter 
3. all federal coal leases 
in effect during the 
Audit Period 
4. federal coal leases newly 
issued on the date of the 
beginning of the report-
ing quarter 
5. federal coal leases newly 
issued during the report-
ing quarter 
6. federal coal leases newly 
issued during the Audit 
Period 
313:110788A 
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